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Abstract 
       
The article is dedicated to the research of prudential supervision of banking, as one of the key factors of ensuring financial sta-
bility. The basics of organization of prudential supervision of banking in current economic circumstances are defined. The practice 
of foreign counties in organization of prudential supervision of banking is considered. Particular attention in the article is paid to 
the question of optimal institutional organization of prudential supervision of banking with an aim to ensure financial stability in the 
country. This paper presents efforts of the author to find out interrelations between institutional architecture of banking supervision 
and financial stability in the country.
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Introduction
 
Supervision and regulation of banking is one of the ba-
sic conditions to provide financial stability in the country. 
Historically, necessity in development of banking supervision 
appeared due to social significance and responsibility of the 
commercial banks toward society. Simultaneously, prudential 
supervision takes a special place in system of banking supervi-
sion, which is the specific means of monitoring and evaluation 
of banking institutions’ risks.
Consequently, nowadays central importance of pruden-
tial supervision of banking in ensuring financial stability is an 
axiom that does not require any evidence and justification. It is 
proved by variety of scientific researches all over the world, de-
voted to the issue of banking supervision and existent practice 
of foreign countries. Analysis of recent researches and publica-
tions has shown that today much attention is paid to the study 
of nature of prudential supervision of banking. But an open 
question is specifics in organization of prudential supervision 
of banking, more generalized – the issue of institutional archi-
tecture of this system.
Thereby, taking into account complexity of this issue, we 
believe it is appropriate to carry out more extensive studies of 
both theoretical and practical aspects of prudential supervision 
of banking organization. Thus the purpose of this paper is to 
identify features of prudential supervision of banking organi-
zation in current economic circumstances and define interre-
lations between institutional architecture of mentioned system 
and financial stability in the country. 
 Discussion
Financial stability is a key to sustainable economic growth. 
Prudential supervision of banking, for its part, has to be one of 
such factors which can provide stability of banking system and 
financial sector of the country by using a number of tools and 
methods of prudential supervision. 
Global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has pushed the global 
financial community to focus on the optimal organization of 
banking supervision and guarantee stability of banking system. 
Effective system of prudential supervision of banking in 
its essence is a complex of measures aimed to prevent systemic 
risks in banking sector, and to increase transparency and ef-
ficiency of the banking system. In other words, understanding 
an importance of each banking institution is main condition of 
effective prudential supervision of banking supervisor. Within 
this criterion supervisor should focus on assessment of risk 
management strategy of a bank. Moreover, this process should 
be continuous and ongoing, because system of risk manage-
ment of a bank is based on the use of a number of financial 
instruments. Their quality and appropriateness can fluctuate 
though.
In terms of effectiveness concept of prudential supervision 
of banking there could be defined two main aspects in this field.
On one hand, prudential supervision of banking should 
be organized so that it insured financial stability, maintained 
appropriate market discipline and favorable business-climate. 
This means total external effect of supervisory system on sys-
tems of higher hierarchical level (financial system, economy of 
country). All these provide effectiveness of prudential supervi-
sion of banking.
On the other hand, prudential supervision of banking 
should be organized to optimize supervisory process, coordi-
nate activity among all participants of supervisory system with 
an aim to construct operative and efficient workflow. The idea 
performs efficiency of prudential supervision of banking.    
Accordingly, we have mentioned two aspects of the con-
cept of prudential supervision of banking effectiveness. They 
both contain result of prudential supervision of banking op-
eration. Research question that we are interested in could be 
formulated as the following: “Is there any interrelation and 
correlation between the first and the second criterion? In other 
words, does internal efficiency of prudential supervision of 
banking - institutional architecture - influence on its external 
effectiveness – financial stability?”
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The most appropriate way to answer the question is to re-
search real practice and experience of countries all over the 
world in organization of prudential supervision of banking sys-
tems. Thus, we have chosen twenty counties and have divided 
them into two groups: developed countries (Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
United Kingdom, the United States of America) and develop-
ing post-Soviet countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Geor-
gia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine).   
Foreign countries’ practice shows that functions of pruden-
tial supervision of banking are allocated in central bank of a 
country, or specially created institutions - supervisory authori-
ty. In addition, there could be a single body of prudential super-
vision of all financial services sector (banking and non-banking 
institutions), or there could operate a number of prudential su-
pervisors, depending on market segment of financial sector or 
delegated functions.
Current experience of analyzed countries in practice proves 
that the countries with lower levels of development and low-
income usually delegate function of prudential supervision of 
banking to central banks. This phenomenon could be explained 
by the fact that central bank is one of few government agencies, 
which is inherent by ability to conduct efficient supervision. 
The presence of single prudential supervisor, represented by 
central bank, rejected special need for separation of powers and 
information between multiple supervisors, which is especially 
appropriate to countries with low levels of development.
In contrast, mentioned practice of organization of pruden-
tial supervision of banking is not proper to countries with an 
experience of recent crisis shocks. In these countries, taking 
into account unsuccessful experience of central bank to realize 
its supervisory functions is likely to be carried by the delega-
tion of prudential supervisory functions to independent public 
institution.
Furthermore, results received by analysis of foreign coun-
tries’ experience enable us to distinguish a number of general 
trends of organization of prudential supervision of banking:
   Delegating of prudential banking supervisory functions to 
dependent state authority is relevant to the countries that have 
positive experience of good governance and existing quality of 
controlling mechanisms. Moreover, under these conditions it 
is possible to distribute supervisory functions between several 
institutions, such as central bank and other state agency.
  It is appropriate to delegate prudential banking supervi-
sory function to independent state authority if the system of 
prudential supervision of banking meets criteria of independ-
ence, accountability and transparency.
    Prudential supervision of banking led by the central bank 
is more reasonable to implement in countries with high legal 
culture, strong legal framework and political stability. Under 
other conditions, the main criteria of the system of prudential 
supervision of banking such as independence, accountability 
and transparency, will not comply fully.
It should be mentioned that it is impossible and meaning-
less to analyze banking supervision apart from financial su-
pervision in general. Main reason of this point of view is that 
banking sector is important part of financial system. 
In this case it has raised an issue how financial supervision 
should be constructed. As an answer for this question there is 
determined specific economic term – institutional architecture 
of financial supervision. We intend to explain the following: 
how is constructed financial supervision system, who are main 
supervisors and how is differentiation of financial regulation 
done?
In any case the key note is that effective regulation should 
be designed to promote the safety and soundness of individ-
ual financial institutions. In practice there could be defined 
different models of financial supervision’s organization, thus 
institutional architecture differs according to each of models 
(Kremers, J.J.M., D. Schoenmaker and P.J. Wierts , 2003). 
Consequently, European Central Bank identified the same three 
main supervisory models in its review published in 2010 (Eu-
ropean Central Bank, 2010).
Model of single supervisor is the first type of financial su-
pervisory organization. We can also face another term, which is 
synonym to the above-mentioned one – model of mega regula-
tor or another formulation as centralized model. In this case, 
all supervisory functions are allocated to the single authority, 
which covers both prudential supervision and investor protec-
tion. Main advantage of this model is ability to centralize all 
power and supervisory resources in order to maintain appro-
priate market discipline and favorable business-climate. But 
at the same time, a single integrated regulator has potential to 
become a classic monopolistic bureaucracy with all related in-
efficiencies. In terms of definition this model lacks regulatory 
competition. Some commentators advocate competition among 
regulators to ensure that they are challenged to outperform 
their competitors.
Twin peaks model is the second type of financial super-
visory organization. Also it is identified as functional model. 
Twin peaks model has been referred to regulation by objective, 
where one agency’s regulatory objective is prudential supervi-
sion with a primary goal of safety and soundness. The second 
agency’s goal is to focus primarily on business conduct and 
consumer protection issues. Twin Peaks model may also be an 
optimal means of ensuring that issues of transparency, market 
integrity, and consumer protection receives sufficient priority.
The last type of financial supervisory organization is a sec-
toral or a vertical model. According to this type each sector, 
such as banking, securities and insurance, is supervised by one 
separate authority. Advantage of the model is high level of spe-
cialization. Disadvantage is diversification of information and 
necessity to coordinate activity between all supervisors.
Thus, in order to answer the research question we have 
already deepened into efficiency concept and have defined 
features of internal financial supervisory organization. But we 
have found it appropriate to analyze some financial stability 
indexes and compare results with type of supervisory organiza-
tion. Accordingly, we have chosen a list of countries and divid-
ed them into two groups: developed countries and developing 
post-soviet countries.
The main characteristics of developed countries in case of 
organization of financial supervision and their financial stabil-
ity indexes are presented in Table1.
The data in table is based on rating agencies’ information. 
Thus, total S&P rating presents credit rating for sovereign gov-
ernments by Standard and Poor’s. Credit rating is Standard & 
Poor’s opinion on the general creditworthiness of an obligor, 
or the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a particu-
lar debt security or other financial obligation. Over the years 
credit ratings have achieved wide investor acceptance as con-
venient tools for differentiating credit quality. The agency rates 
borrowers on a scale from AAA, investment grades are from 
AAA to BBB, below that (BB to D) are non-investment grades 
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(also known as junk bonds) (One World Nations Online, 2012). 
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services currently rates 126 sover-
eign governments and has established transfer and convertibil-
ity (T&C) assessments for each country with a rated sovereign, 
as shown in the Table 1 and 2. A T&C assessment is the rating 
associated with the likelihood of the sovereign restricting non-
sovereign access to foreign exchange needed for debt service. 
For most countries, Standard & Poor’s analysis concludes that 
this risk is less than the risk of sovereign default on foreign-
currency obligations; thus, most T&C assessments exceed the 
sovereign foreign currency rating. Non-sovereign entity can 
be rated as high as the T&C assessment if its stress-tested op-
erating and financial characteristics support the higher rating 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2012).
According to the Table 1 we can see, that current practice 
of developed countries confirms implementation of all three 
types of supervisory models. But it is obvious that majority of 
analyzed countries gives preference to twin peaks model while 
dividing supervisory functions between two supervisors (Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Unit-
ed Kingdom). Such functional diversification of supervisory 
competence could ensure transparency, market integrity and 
consumer protection. The minority of the sample –Germany 
– is representative of single-authority model while Greece and 
Spain have implemented sectoral model.
While talking about developing countries of post-soviet 
area the data is presented in Table 2. In this case we have taken 
under investigation such post-Soviet representatives as: Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Russia and Ukraine.
As we can see, minority of the analyzed countries has im-
plemented functional model and majority has given its prefer-
Table 1. Organization of financial supervision and financial stability indexes of developed countries in 2012
Source: (Bank of England, n.d.) (Central Bank of France, n.d.) (Central Bank of Germany, n.d.) (Central Bank of 
Greece , n.d.) (Central Bank of Italy, n.d.) (Central Bank of Netherlands , n.d.) (Central Bank of Portugal, n.d.) (Cen-
tral Bank of Spain , n.d.) (Financial Supervisory Authority of Finland , n.d.) (National bank of Belgium , n.d.) (Stand-
ard & Poor’s, 2012) (One World Nations Online, 2012).
Source: (Central bank of Azerbaijan, n.d.) (Central Bank of Estonia, n.d.) (Central Bank of Lithuania, n.d.) (Central 
Bank of Russian Federation, n.d.) (Financial and Capital Market Commission of Latvia , n.d.) (Financial Supervi-
sion Authority of Estonia , n.d.) (National bank of Belarus, n.d.) (National bank of Georgia, n.d.) (National bank of 
Kazakhstan, n.d.) (National bank of Ukraine, n.d.) (Standard & Poor’s, 2012) (One World Nations Online, 2012)
Table 2. Organization of financial supervision and financial stability indexes of post-soviet countries in 2012
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ence to the sectoral model (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, and 
Ukraine). Thus, practice of post-Soviet countries differs from 
the developed one. But still there are some representatives of 
single authority model, such as Georgia, Kazakhstan and Lith-
uania. Talking about Estonia and Latvia, these Baltic States are 
representatives of twin peaks model and follow preferential 
European practice. 
According to conducted research, post-soviet countries 
within criterion of institutional supervisory architecture could 
be divided into two groups: those where the functions of pru-
dential supervision of banking  are delegated to the central bank 
and countries where this competence is transferred to specially 
created institutions. In addition, there may be a single body of 
prudential supervision of all financial services sector (banking 
and non-banking institutions), or there could operate a number 
of prudential supervisors, depending on the market segment of 
financial services.
It should be noted that according to the research field the 
common feature of post-Soviet countries was complete or frac-
tional diligence of supervisory functions to central banks.
Thus, central bank acts as the main body and single pru-
dential banking supervisor in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.
Prudential supervision of banking in Ukraine is conducted 
by the National Bank of Ukraine. Particularly, General De-
partment of Banking Supervision implements the main goal 
- effective banking supervision over banking institutions. In 
addition, Department of normative methodology of banking 
regulation and supervision is directly responsible for develop-
ment and improvement of methodological framework of bank-
ing regulation and banking supervision, planning, development 
and improvement of the mentioned aspects. (National bank of 
Ukraine, n.d.).
In Georgia, the National Bank of Georgia is the only body 
of prudential supervision, which includes two main compo-
nents - prudential banking and non-banking supervision. In 
turn, banking supervision involves implementation of super-
visory functions over banking institutions, while non-banking 
supervision  - over insurance companies, pension and invest-
ment funds, credit unions, microfinance agencies, etc. (Nation-
al bank of Georgia, n.d.).
In contrast to the experience of Georgia, the system of 
prudential supervision of banking of Azerbaijan is closed to 
Ukrainian one. Thus, the main and the only prudential banking 
supervisory authority is the central bank of the country, in par-
ticular Department of prudential policies and methodologies. 
In addition, the central bank has only the function of prudential 
supervision of banking institutions, and does not reflect its ac-
tivity to non-banking financial and credit institutions (Central 
bank of Azerbaijan, n.d.).
While sharing the experience of Ukraine and Azerbaijan, 
Republic of Belarus also delegates the role of a single body of 
prudential supervision of banking to the National Bank of Be-
larus. In the structure of the central bank prudential supervision 
is conducted by Department of banking supervision, includ-
ing Administration of remote supervision over system-forming 
banks, Administration of remote supervision over non-system-
forming banks and Administration of macro-prudential super-
vision (National bank of Belarus, n.d.).
In the Republic of Kazakhstan its National Bank carries 
out supervision over the financial market as a single mega 
regulator. In particular, the function of prudential supervision 
counts on the Committee on financial control and supervision 
of financial market and financial organizations of the National 
Bank of Kazakhstan (National bank of Kazakhstan, n.d.).  
Russian practice performs a model where all the functions 
of banking supervision are delegated to the central bank of the 
country. Particularly, prudential supervision relies on Depart-
ment of prudential supervision of the Central Bank of Russian 
Federation (Central Bank of Russian Federation, n.d.).
Simultaneously, Latvia follows the experience of a number 
of European countries, delegating the function of prudential 
supervision of banking to authorized institution that is part of 
the country’s central bank under its jurisdiction. Thus, Com-
mission for Financial and Capital Market is an autonomous 
agency that supervises, including prudential supervision all the 
participants of the financial sector of the economy (Financial 
and Capital Market Commission of Latvia , n.d.).
Estonia, in turn, follows Scandinavian countries and dis-
tributes prudential supervision of banking function between the 
central bank of the country and specifically created authorized 
institution which is independent from the central bank. Thus, 
the Central Bank of Estonia is given the function of macro-
prudential supervision, which is carried out by means of analy-
sis and assessment of systemic risks of the financial stability. 
Besides, micro-prudential supervising over all the financial 
sector participants is passed to Financial Supervision Authority 
(Central Bank of Estonia, n.d.) (Financial Supervision Author-
ity of Estonia , n.d.).
Accordingly, special attention regarding prudential super-
vision of banking in countries of post-soviet area is paid to the 
Baltic States: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as the institutional 
architectures of prudential supervision of banking are different 
in each of these countries. Also, according to the S&P credit rat-
ing we can set these countries into such order: Estonia (AA-), 
Lithuania (BBB), Latvia (BBB-). Comparing with institutional 
architecture: Estonia – Twin peaks model (FSA – independ-
ent of CB), Lithuania – Single authority model, Latvia - Twin 
peaks model (FCMC – under jurisdiction of CB).
Thus, Lithuania follows the experience of such European 
countries as Germany and Belgium, where central bank is con-
centrating function of prudential supervision over all players 
of the financial sector, not just banking institutions, and is sin-
gle regulator of financial system. In turn, Latvia follows the 
practice of United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands and France 
in delegating prudential supervisory functions to specifically 
created authorized institution subordinated to the central bank 
of the country, which supervises all financial institutions. The 
system of prudential supervision of Estonia is similar to Scan-
dinavian countries such as Finland, where prudential supervi-
sion of banking divides between the central bank and special 
independent authority. However, common feature of all three 
Baltic countries is the fact that prudential supervision is mutual 
for both banking and non-banking sectors of financial sphere.
Summarizing all the information above, an effective sys-
tem of banking supervision should have clear responsibilities 
and objectives for each authority involved in supervision of 
banks independently from the model of financial supervision 
and other specifics of institutional architecture. Each such au-
thority should possess operational independence, transparent 
processes, sound governance and adequate resources, and be 
accountable for the discharge of its duties (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 2).
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Conclusions and Propositions
Our research of current global trends has proved the fact 
that it is totally impossible to build universal institutional struc-
ture of prudential supervision of banking in order to provide 
the highest level of financial stability in a country. The main 
reason is availability of a number of features due to historical, 
economic, social and political factors which influence on bank-
ing system of each country. Therefore, taking into account giv-
en peculiarities, system of prudential supervision of banking 
should be arranged considering both international standards 
and national characteristics of financial system of a country.
The main point is that regardless of the type of institutional 
structure, an efficient system of prudential supervision of bank-
ing requires proper understanding by supervisor of operations 
of individual banks and banking groups, and banking system 
as a whole. Such activity must be focused on safety, reliability 
and stability. In other words, the main condition to efficient 
prudential supervision system’s organization is consciousness 
by supervisor of each banking institution’s importance. Moreo-
ver, this process should be prolonged and continuous, because 
system of risk management is based on usage of a range of 
financial instruments. It quality and appropriateness may fluc-
tuate from time to time.
That is why system of prudential supervision of banking 
should consider all mentioned features by implementing pru-
dential supervision of banking in order to insure financial sta-
bility in the country.
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